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JURISDICTION
This is an appeal from an order of the Third Judicial District Court entered on
defendants' post-judgment motions relating to defendants' continuing lease obligations and rights
and plaintiffs cross-appeal of the district court's order denying its motion for attorneys' fees
under the lease. The Supreme Court has jurisdiction of this matter pursuant to Utah Code Ann.
§ 78-2-2(3)0).
ISSUES FOR REVIEW AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
(Limited to Issues on Cross-Appeal)
Issue No. 1: Whether the District Court abused its discretion in denying Emily Walker
Trust's ("Walker") Motion for Attorneys' Fees under the Sparks Lease for fees incurred in
responding to Sparks' Motion?
Standard of Appellate Review for Issue No. 1: The district court's decision to deny
attorneys' fees relating to the Sparks' motion is reviewed under a "clear abuse of discretion"
standard. Equitable Life & Cas. Ins. Co. v. Ross, 849 P.2d 1187, 1994 (UtahCt. App. 1993).
Issue No. 2; Whether, after hearing that Sparks had not been provided adequate
documentation of deficiency amounts and admonishing Walker to provide such documentation
in the future, the district court abused its discretion in denying Walker's claim for attorneys' fees
relating to its motion to collect the $921 deficiency?
Standard of Appellate Review for Issue No. 2: The district court's denial of attorneys'
fees relating to Walker's motion to collect a deficiency is reviewed under an abuse of discretion
standard. Equitable Life & Cas. Ins. Co. v. Ross, 849 P.2d 1187, 1194 (Utah Ct. App. 1993).

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
(Limited to Issues on Cross-Appeal)
On July 28, 1993, Sparks filed its motion for declaratory relief and for establishment
of a mechanism to improve efficiency of lease administration during the remaining years of an
extended lease while protecting Sparks' residual rights and Walker's rights. Walker sought to
recover attorneys' fees incurred in responding to Sparks' motion under the attorneys' fees clause
of the Sparks Lease. ROA 808. Sparks responded to this request for fees by explaining that
the request did not fall within the express wording of the Sparks Lease attorneys' fee provision.
ROA 831-832. Walker also sought to recover $300 in attorneys' fees expended in filing a
motion for summary judgment regarding a rent deficiency payment of $921.70. ROA 834.
At the hearing on these motions on September 24, 1993, the district court rejected
Walker's requests for attorneys' fees. Sparks explained at length the course of its attempts to
obtain documentation from Walker showing precisely what deficiency was owed. ROA 896-898,
900, 907. (A copy of the transcript of the September 24, 1993 hearing is attached hereto as
Exhibit "A.") Following this discussion, the Court agreed that Walker should provide such
documentation in the future and, because of questions regarding the documentation and the fact
that Sparks had tendered the payments, denied Walker's request for attorneys' fees. ROA 907908. The district court also denied Walker's request for fees relating to Sparks' motions because
it felt the motions were post-judgment requests for remedies. ROA 905. Walker filed its Notice
of Cross-Appeal relating to these attorneys' fees issues on November 22, 1993.
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
(Limited to Issues on Cross-Appeal)
Walker has failed to provide any convincing reason for disturbing the district court's
discretion in denying both of Walker's requests for attorneys' fees. Walker's request for fees
in responding to Sparks' motion does not fall within the specific terms of the Sparks Lease
attorney fee provision. Additionally, as the Court noted, it pertains to a post-judgment remedy.
And, in appealing the district court's denial of attorneys' fees associated with its motion for
summary judgment, Walker ignores the lengthy discussion at the hearing regarding Walker's
failure to provide Sparks with documentation of the monthly deficiencies for which it requested
payment. In fact, the Court's denial of the attorneys' fee request accompanied its oral direction
to Walker to promptly supply such information to Sparks in the future. In short, the district
court properly exercised its discretion in denying both requests.
ARGUMENT
Sections I, II and III below pertain to issues arising from Sparks' appeal. Sections IV and
V pertain to issues raised in Walker's Cross-Appeal.
I.

WALKER HAS IGNORED THE PURPOSE OF DECLARATORY RELIEF AND
CONFUSED THE MEANING OF RIPENESS,
Walker's objection to Sparks' appeal regarding excess rents rests primarily on the fact

that the excess rents have not yet been paid, even though there is a current legal obligation to
pay them. In essence, Walker argues that because the money is not yet in hand, though it must
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be paid, Sparks' request is "prospective, speculative and remote/'1 Walker's brief, P. 10.
Walker's argument, however, confuses the purpose of declaratory relief actions and ignores Utah
case law granting declaratory relief regarding future lease rights.
As Sparks noted in its opening brief, the purpose of declaratory relief is to enable
parties to resolve uncertainty and controversy before trouble developed or harm occurred. Salt
Lake County v. Salt Lake City, 570 P.2d 119, 120 (Utah 1977). However, the controversy must
be actual or there must be "a substantial likelihood that one will develop . . . ." Id. at 121. In
support of its argument, Walker recites a litany of speculative possibilities which would affect
only the amount paid but not the substitute tenant's legal obligation to make the payments.
However, if Walker's argument were accepted, then declaratory relief would only be available
to remedy a situation after the fact. Such an action would no longer be one for declaratory
relief, but would be one for the recovery of amounts owed but unpaid. In essence, Walker's
interpretation of declaratory relief would strip it of much of its utility in cases where legal duties
and rights are fixed though the harm has yet to occur. Utah case law plainly rejects such an
interpretation.

It is difficult in addressing this issue to overlook the acerbic tone of Walker's brief.
Walker goes so far as to claim that Sparks' position is not only "utterly without merit," but
also "advanced solely for the purpose of causing delay." Walker's brief, p. 8. Suggesting
that Sparks' argument is without merit flatly ignores Utah case law and the purpose of
declaratory relief. And, Walker's unfounded claim that Sparks has appealed this issue for
purposes of delay is offensive. These claims and other inflammatory comments in
Walker's brief are addressed in some detail in Section III below.
4

In Kapetenov v. Small Claims Court, 659 P.2d 1049, 1051 (Utah 1983), the Utah
Supreme Court explained that declaratory judgments "provide the means of resolving
uncertainties and controversies before obligations are repudiated, rights are invaded or wrongs
are committed." (emphasis in original) The court further noted that, contrary to Walker's
suggestion, "no actual wrong or loss need exist in order to sustain an action for declaratory
judgment." Id. In the present case, the only fact remaining unknown is the actual amount paid
by the substitute tenant. However, neither party can dispute that the substitute tenant is under
a legally enforceable obligation to make those payments when due and that the parties contest
how those payments should be applied. Utah courts have previously held that disputed future
obligations or rights under current leases are an appropriate subject of declaratory relief.
Gillmor v. Gillmor, 596 P.2d 645, 646 (Utah 1979).
In other situations, the Utah Supreme Court has also granted declaratory relief even though
the rights at issue are contingent on future conduct. In Sanpete County Water Conservancy Dist.
v. Price River Water Users Assoc., 652 P.2d 1302, 1306 (Utah 1982), the defendants argued that
no justiciable controversy existed because "the contractual water rights which form the basis of
plaintiffs applications are contingent on construction of the Gooseberry Project, which
construction has not begun and may never take place." The defendants claimed the issues were
therefore "hypothetical" or "abstract in nature." Id. The Supreme Court rejected defendants'
argument, holding that "a justiciable controversy does not depend on a showing that the opposing
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interests giving rise to the controversy are perfected or immediately exercisable." Id.; See also,
Whitmore v. Murray City, 107 Utah 445, 154 P.2d 748, 751 (1944).
Finally, Walker attempts to argue that the district court could have denied Sparks'
motion as a matter of discretion. However, whether the district court could have exercised such
discretion in the present case is irrelevant, because the district court decided that the issue was
not yet justiciable or ripe. ROA 860, 905. Determinations of justiciability and ripeness go to
the Court's jurisdiction to render a declaratory judgment. Barnard v. Utah State Bar, 857 P.2d
917, 191 (Utah 1993); Baird v. Utah, 574 P.2d 713, 715 (Utah 1978). Having decided that the
controversy was not ripe, .the district specifically stated that it was not reaching the merits of
Sparks' request. ROA 904-905. How the district court would have exercised its discretion if
it felt it had jurisdiction to do so is completely speculative and irrelevant.
In conclusion, Sparks presented a ripe and justiciable issue for declaratory relief.

In

arguing otherwise, Walker ignores the parties' and substitute tenant's current lease obligations
and relevant Utah law, choosing instead to rely on speculative and irrelevant circumstances
affecting only the amount of the obligation. The district erred as a matter of law in deciding the
issue was not ripe. And, as explained in Sparks opening brief, the excess rent should be applied
to reduce the total deficiency under the Sparks Lease.

6

H. IN OBJECTING TO SPARKS' ATTEMPT TO ESTABLISH A MORE EFFICIENT
MECHANISM FOR ADMINISTRATION OF THE SPARKS LEASE. WALKER
RELIES ON MISCHARACTERIZATIONS OF SPARKS' REQUESTED RELIEF
AND FAILS TO RECOGNIZE THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE COURT'S
ERRONEOUS LEGAL RULINGS,
In order to assess the merits of Sparks' appeal on this issue, it is important to recognize
(1) the limited relief Sparks was asking for and (2) the basis of the district court's decision.
Walker, in mischaracterizmg Sparks' requested relief, fails to address the permissibility of the
relief Sparks was actually seeking. And, Walker fails to recognize that the district court's
decision was framed by its misunderstanding of the parties' status. When viewed accurately,
the relief Sparks actually sought properly acknowledges and protects the rights of both parties,
increases efficiency in the post-judgment administration of long-term leases and consequently
reduces inequity.
Throughout its brief, Walker repeatedly suggests that Sparks is seeking a full assignment
of the lease of any substitute tenant placed in the premises. This creates the impression, and is
even suggested by Walker, that Sparks seeks physical control of the premises and supervision
of the substitute tenant. Walker relies on this mischaracterization and overstatement in an effort
to prove that Sparks' proposed relief is inequitable and legally unjustifiable. However, as Sparks
has frequently explained, the relief it seeks is highly limited and specifically focussed to protect
the parties' rights and increase the efficiency of post-judgment administration of long-term
leases. The relief Sparks seeks, rather than what Walker describes, is legally permissible,
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appropriate and consistent with the objectives the Utah Supreme Court sought to further in Reid
v. Mutual of Omaha, 776 P.2d 896, 905 (Utah 1989).
The relief Sparks seeks is clear from the record. In its Reply Memorandum filed with the
district court, Sparks explained that it sought "limited procedural relief" under which Walker
"would still retain control of the substitute lease and be responsible for insuring the substitute
tenant's compliance with other lease terms." ROA 827, 830.2 Again, at the hearing, Sparks
repeatedly explained that it sought only to pursue monetary defaults of the substitute tenant after
Walker had a reasonable time to collect and have responsibility for retaining, with Walker's
approval, and directly paying a broker. ROA 886-888, 890-891. Finally, in its opening brief
in this appeal, Sparks explained the limited nature of the relief it sought. Brief of the Appellant,
pp. 17, 22-23.
Sparks sought this relief for two interrelated purposes. First, Sparks believed the procedure
established in Reid v. Mutual of Omaha did not protect its residual rights as lessee under a valid
lease to ensure full utilization of the premises.

Second, Sparks believed the established

procedure was inequitable for reasons explained in its Brief of the Appellant (pp. 22-23) and its
Memorandum in Support of Motion to Assign Lease and for Declaratory Relief. ROA 789-791.

In its initial brief filed with the district court on July 28, 1993, Sparks requested a full
assignment; however, by the time Sparks filed its Reply Memorandum it had tailored its
requested relief more carefully to further its dual objective.

8

Sparks recognized that the outcome of its motion might hinge on a legal determination of
what residual rights it possessed and of the potential inequity of the current procedure. The
district court recognized the significance of this issue as well. In one exchange between the
court and Sparks' local counsel at the hearing, Sparks' local counsel responded to a question
from the court regarding Utah authority on this issue by stating "I don't think the issue has come
before Utah appellate courts as to exactly what - I mean, there's Reid v. Mutual of Omaha,
which establishes sort of the broad features of how this procedure is to be established; but I
don't know that they ever directly address exactly what the residual rights of a defaulting tenant
are." The district court then responded M[a]nd I think that's exactly the issue." ROA 890.
The district court then assessed what rights, if any, Sparks had. The district court made
that assessment under the belief that the Sparks Lease was terminated and the Judgment awarded
Walker possession of the premises.3 It seems obvious that a court will consider the existence
and nature of a tenant's residual rights differently when the lease is terminated and possession
awarded to the landlord than when the lease is still in effect. This distinction colored the district
court's application of the law to the facts of this case, as noted in the excerpt from the district
court's comments quoted in Sparks opening brief on appeal, p. 21. In fact, the district court

3

Walker disputes whether the portion of the district court's order stating that Walker had
been awarded possession of the premises may be addressed on appeal. However, Walker's
argument is not appropriate to the circumstances involved here. Rather, cases addressing
the appeal of a court's findings of fact and conclusions of law or the judgment are
applicable. As to such errors, an objection need not be filed with the trial court before
appeal. Dugan v. Jones, 114 P.2d 955, 957 (Utah 1986).
9

acknowledged that Sparks' proposal might be more efficient and better for the parties; however,
it believed it had no authority to award the relief. ROA 900-905.
Although the district court's misunderstanding of the facts framed its legal analysis of
Sparks' rights, Walker argues that the district court's misunderstanding was irrelevant because
(1) the Sparks Lease barred Sparks from protecting its interests in the manner requested, and (2)
the district court had broad discretion to deny Sparks' motion. However, the Sparks Lease, like
other leases, is subject to certain common law rights. And, in any event, the requested relief
is consistent with the relief provided in Article 46.

Finally, as with the motion regarding

declaratory relief, it is speculative to guess how the district court would have exercised its
discretion if it felt it had the option.
Although leases are partially contractual in nature, they are still subject to principles which
the parties apparently are not at complete liberty to ignore. For instance, the right to dispossess
a tenant without notice or legal process and seize its property is of questionable validity.
Hackford v. Snow, 657 P.2d 1271, 1275 n. 5 (Utah 1982); see also, Wade v. Jobe, 818 P.2d
1006, 1018 (Utah 1991) (per Durham, J. with Zimmerman, J., concurring). In fact, Reid v.
Mutual of Omaha demonstrates that Article 46 is subject, like any other lease provision, to
general principles of common law. The bare wording of Article 46 grants Walker the right to
rent or not rent on any terms its chooses "in its sole discretion/' In addition, Article 46 does
not mandate mitigation as an obligation of the landlord but simply permits reletting at the
landlord's discretion. Neither party in this lawsuit has contested that these portions of Article
10

46 are subject to Reid's requirement that the landlord must actively mitigate its loss in a
commercially reasonable fashion. Because Article 46 is subject to these limitations, it would
also be subject to a similar mechanism that would more effectively protect the lessee's interest
without infringing the lessor's right to receive all to which the lease entitles it. As explained
in Sparks' opening brief, Sparks' requested relief, as opposed to Walker's mischaracterization
of it, fulfills this objective ensuring protection of the landlord's recovery and reducing economic
waste.4
In addition, the limited relief Sparks requests does not run afoul of Article 46. Sparks has
requested the right to receive notice of monetary defaults and to pursue the defaulting tenant for
the deficiency. Accordingly, the costs and burdens attendant to such litigation are borne by
Sparks rather than Walker.5 Pursuing the monetary default of substitute tenants is consistent

Sparks' relief is also consistent with, and efficiently promotes, several of the Supreme
Court's objectives in Reid. In Reid, the court recognized that "the economies of both the
state and nation benefit from a rule that encourages the reletting of premises, which returns
them to productive use, rather than permitting a landlord to let them sit idle while it seeks
rents from the breaching tenant." 776 P.2d at 905. As a result, the supreme court
established its procedure in an attempt to "insure that serious efforts are made to redeploy
the rental property in a productive fashion . . .." Id.
The relevant portion of Article 46 provides as follows:
Should Lessor elect to re-enter . . . [it may] relet said premises or any part
thereof for such term of [sic] terms . . . and at such rental or rentals and upon
such other terms and conditions as Lessor in its sole discretion may deem it
advisable; upon each such reletting all rentals received by the Lessor for such
reletting shall be applied, first to the payment of any indebtedness other than rent
due from Lessee to Lessor; second, to the payment of any costs and expenses
(continued...)
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with Article 46 in that Sparks would be directly assuming the attorneys fees otherwise paid by
Walker, would be making the full monthly rental payments due under the Sparks Lease to
Walker and would offset against that amount any recovery from the defaulting tenant. As a
result, Walker would not be deprived of anything it is entitled to under Article 46 and would,
in fact, be spared the necessity of initial outlays for attorneys fees, other expenses and delays
in payment. Walker would achieve similar benefits by Sparks' directly retaining and paying a
broker.6 Accordingly, the limited relief Sparks seeks is not inconsistent with Article 46.
Walker next argues that the district court's decision was not an abuse of its discretion.
However, the correctness of the district court's determination of the law applicable to the facts
is reviewed under a standard between correctness of error and abuse of discretion.

Utah v.

Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 937 (Utah 1993). As noted above, by applying the law to the facts as it
understood them, the district court believed it would violate the landlord's legal rights to grant

5

6

(... continued)
of such reletting, including brokerage fees and attorneys fees and costs of such
alterations and repairs; third, to the payment of any rent due and unpaid
hereunder, and the the [sic] residue, if any, shall be held by Lessor and applied
in payment of future rent as the same may become due and payable hereunder.
In addition, the requested relief would not infringe on Walker's right to relet the premises.
Walker's right to relet under Article 46 is currently subject to the requirements of Reid.
Although the relief Sparks requests poses no greater infringement than Reid, it is more
efficient and fairer to Sparks' interests. As Sparks has requested, Sparks would retain and
pay a broker and could monitor its efforts. Walker would also consult with the broker and
would approve and contract directly with any substitute tenant the broker locates. In the
interim, Sparks would be paying the monthly lease payments.
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Sparks' relief even though it acknowledged the appeal and potential benefits of the procedure
that Sparks proposed. ROA 900-905. This understanding of the facts, and the applicable law,
was in error.
Walker downplays the significance of the district court's misunderstanding regarding
termination of the lease and a judgment of possession. However, both facts are critical to how
the judge applied the law in this case. A primary issue in Sparks' motion involved the nature
and extent of its residual rights. Because the district court considered the Sparks Lease
terminated and possession awarded to Walker, it was not likely to find any residual rights left.
Had the court been aware that the lease will still in effect and possession had never been
awarded to Walker, it may have reached a different conclusion. In fact, by applying the law
to the facts as it understood them, the district court felt itself bound to rule in the manner it did.
ROA 902-905.
In conclusion, Sparks sought limited relief in order to preserve its residual rights, honor
the landlord's rights and increase the efficiency of the judgment's operation during the coming
eight years. In denying Sparks' request, the district court had an incorrect understanding of
critical facts and felt itself obligated to deny the relief as violative of the landlord's legal rights.
However, recognizing that a defaulting tenant liable under a nonterminated long-term lease
retains residual rights to ensure the full utilization of the premises, Sparks' motion was not
contrary to the applicable law or lease provisions. Accordingly, the district court's decision
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should be reversed, the residual rights of the defaulting tenant should be recognized and the case
remanded to the district court to enter an order consistent with the law and facts.
m . WALKER'S REQUEST FOR SANCTIONS IS INFLAMMATORY AND
UNFOUNDED.
After reviewing Walker's opening brief, we were left to wonder what in our appeal
sparked such a vitriolic attack, at times bordering on unsupported ad hominum argument. The
acerbic and inflammatory tone of Walker's brief as a whole and specifically its Rule 33 request
makes a dispassionate response difficult. The initial inclination is to meet hostility in kind;
however, as the Utah Supreme Court noted, "vitriol is expensive these days . . . what with the
spiraling cost of professional medication." Carroll v. Birdsall, 24 Utah 2d 411, 473 P.2d 398,
401 (1970). As explained below, and simply put, Walker's Rule 33 request is without factual
support and without assistance from Utah case law.
Walker provides no support for its fully speculative accusation that Sparks brought this
appeal solely for purposes of delay. Walker relies entirely on a sanction entered at the trial
court level; however, Walker provides no indication that this appeal was brought for any
improper purpose. In making its unfounded allegation of delay, Walker completely fails to
mention that it is receiving all deficiency payments due under the Sparks Lease and that Sparks
requested no stay in connection with this appeal and the district court has granted no stay. As
a result, the appeal has no effect on Walker receiving in a timely manner all the relief it was
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granted under the judgment. Accordingly, Walker's allegation of delay, and the thinly veiled
implication of bad faith, appears to constitute little more than gamesmanship.
Aside from delay, attorneys' fees and costs under Utah R. App. P. 33 may be
awarded only where the appeal is "frivolous." Rule 33 defines a frivolous claim as "one that
is not grounded in fact, not warranted by existing law, or not based on a good-faith argument
to extend, modify, or reverse existing law." As this Court has recently noted, "'sanctions for
frivolous appeals should only be applied in egregious cases, lest there be an improper chilling
of the right to appeal erroneous lower court decisions.'" In re Estate of Hamilton, 869 P.2d
971, 976 (Utah Ct. App. 1994), quoting, Porco v. Porco, 752 P.2d 365, 369 (Utah Ct. App.
1988). Even a "strained reading" of the relevant law does not constitute an egregious case
unless "all competent counsel would recognize the arguments made on appeal are without merit."
Farrell v. Porter, 830 P.2d 299, 302 (Utah Ct. App. 1992).
The issues Sparks raises on appeal are hardly strained and far from egregious. In the
case of Sparks' request for declaratory relief, Sparks seeks reversal of the district court's
erroneous assessment of the issue's ripeness. Far from being a strained interpretation of the
law, Sparks' argument is actually supported both by the Utah Supreme Court's express
declarations of the purpose of declaratory relief as well as its previous case law regarding future
lease rights. See, Section I above. Walker's suggestion that this argument is "utterly without
merit" or interposed for the purposes of delay is unfounded and troubling.
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In its attempt to obtain a more efficient procedure for administering future long-term
lease obligations following entry of judgment, Sparks admittedly seeks the Court's assistance in
clarifying or expanding on Utah law in areas where it is either silent or inadequate. Sparks has
never argued otherwise. Before the district court, Sparks' counsel repeatedly acknowledged an
absence of Utah case law regarding the rights of which it sought recognition. ROA 885-886,
889-890. Although the district court acknowledged that the procedure Sparks proposed may be
more efficient than the one established under Reid v. Mutual of Omaha, the district court felt
that as a matter of law it could not grant such relief. ROA 900-905. This appeal, seeking
resolution from Utah's appellate courts of the correctness of the district court's understanding
of the law, is hardly without merit. And, it is precisely the type of claim as to which the
imposition of sanctions would have a chilling effect. The clarification of the rights of defaulting
tenants under long-term commercial leases is one of considerable economic significance in Utah.
An attempt to seek clarification of Utah law in this area or an expansion of a tenant's rights can
hardly be deemed frivolous.
In short, Sparks has not brought this appeal for any improper purpose but has sought
both a reversal of the district court's erroneous legal interpretation and a recognition of any
residual rights it may have under Utah law in the context of a long-term commercial lease.
Walker's in terrorem approach to responding to Sparks' appeal is an unjustifiable litigation
tactic. As Sparks' appeal is neither frivolous nor brought for an improper purpose, Walker's
Rule 33 request should be denied.
16

IV. THE DISTRICT COURT PROPERLY EXERCISED ITS DISCRETION IN
DENYING WALKER'S REQUEST FOR ATTORNEYS' FEES ASSOCIATED
WITH SPARKS' MOTION.
At the district court level, Walker claimed that, under Article 46 of the Sparks Lease,
it was entitled to its attorneys' fees related to opposing Sparks' post-judgment motions. Walker
appeals the district court's denial of its request for attorneys' fees solely on the basis of the
district court's statement that the Sparks Lease was terminated. Walker, however, wholly
ignores and is silent regarding the wording of the Order it drafted and the wording of Article
46, both of which firmly support the district court's decision.
Under Utah law, attorneys' fees are only awarded where they are provided for by
contract or by statute or as a legitimate item of damages resulting from wrongful conduct.
Western Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Marchant, 615 P.2d 423, 427 (Utah 1980). Where there is a
contract, attorneys' fees are only awarded in accordance with the contract's terms. Equitable
Life & Cas. Ins. Co. v. Ross, 849 P.2d 1187, 1194 (Utah Ct. App. 1993), cert, denied, 860
P.2d 943 (Utah 1993). And, a district court's decision regarding an award of attorneys' fees
will only be overturned on a "clear abuse of discretion." Id.
In the present case, the district court's order states that Walker's first request for
attorneys' fees "although arising out of the Lease, arises out of post-judgment requests for
remedies and therefore is denied." (emphasis added) The Sparks Lease, out of which Walker's

17

request arises, expressly defines the circumstances under which attorneys' fees are recoverable.
Sparks' post-judgment motions at issue in this appeal do not fall within the terms of Article 46.7
Although Walker expends much energy in its brief addressing the district court's
erroneous belief that the Sparks Lease was terminated, it makes no mention at all of how its
request falls within the terms of Article 46. Sparks' post-judgment motions, on the other hand,
sought to establish a more efficient mechanism for administering the judgment while preserving
the parties' rights and to obtain declaratory relief regarding the status of future excess rents.
Unlike the situations contemplated and listed in Article 46, Sparks' post-judgment motions did
not request a finding that one party was "defaulting" or recovery from a defaulting party.
In sum, although the district court may have been incorrect in its belief that the Sparks
Lease was terminated, Walker excluded that part of the court's statement in the order it drafted
and the district court signed. Walker's wording states only that the request arose out of the
Sparks Lease and involved post-judgment requests for remedies.

And, Walker has made

absolutely no showing that it would be entitled to attorneys' fees under Article 46 of the Sparks

The relevant portion of Article 46, entitled "Default of Lessee," provides:
In case of suit shall be brought for recovery of possession of the
leased premises, for the recovery of rent or any other amount
due under the provisions of this Lease, or because of the breach
of any other covenant herein contained on the part of the Lessee
to be kept or performed, and a breach shall be established, that
defaulting [sic] shall pay to the other party all expenses incurred
therefor, including a reasonable attorney's fee.

18

Lease. As such, it has failed to show that the district court abused its discretion. Its appeal
regarding the district court's denial of attorneys' fees relating to Sparks' post-judgment motions
should therefore be denied.
V.

THE DISTRICT COURT PROPERLY EXERCISED ITS DISCRETION IN
DENYING WALKER'S REQUEST FOR ATTORNEYS' FEES ASSOCIATED
WITH ITS MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT,
Walker appeals the district court's denial of its request for $300 in attorneys' fees

associated with its Motion for Summary Judgment seeking a cumulative deficiency of $921.70.
As Walker acknowledges, the payment was tendered to Walker at the hearing. However,
Walker wholly ignores the court's consideration of the fact, following lengthy discussion, that
payment was delayed due to Walker's failure to provide adequate documentation. After hearing
the explanation of both parties, the court denied Walker's fee request and directed Walker to
provide adequate documentation to Sparks in the future if it expected prompt payments. In light
of the full record, the district court's decision hardly constitutes a "clear abuse of discretion"
or "patent error."
At the hearing, the court asked Sparks why monthly deficiencies under the Sparks
Lease had not been paid earlier. A lengthy discussion followed, focussing almost exclusively
on the fact that Walker never provided Sparks with requested documentation so that it could
calculate and verify the deficiency. ROA 896-898, 900, 906-908. Sparks' corporate counsel,
Brian Wanca, informed the coun that Sparks never received documentation verifying what the

19

substitute tenants were actually paying each month and that, when Sparks requested the
information, Walker's response was to file a motion for summary judgment. ROA 907.
After hearing Sparks' explanation and Walker's response, the district court stated
"that's one of the reasons is at this point I understand there's some dispute about that, and that's
why I'm not going to award any attorneys' fees and costs at this time." ROA 907. He then
informed Walker's counsel "I would think you ought to advise your client that the Court has
made this ruling that the information be supplied - excuse me - promptly, if your client wants
prompt payment." ROA 908.8 The district court also stated that in the future it would not
hesitate to award attorneys' fees against any party dilatory in fulfilling either the obligation to
provide documentation or to make timely payment. ROA 907.
In short, Walker attempts to meet its burden of proving an abuse of discretion by
ignoring the context of the district court's decision. The district court reached its decision
following an extended discussion of Walker's failure to provide Sparks with the documentation
it requested. Following that discussion, the district court denied Walker's request for attorneys'
fees and directed it to provide such documentation to Sparks in the future. As such, the district
court's decision was highly appropriate and merits affirmation.

Earlier in the hearing, the district court stated that the "landlord clearly has a duty to
provide to the defaulting tenant information which will give that information on - or give
that tenant a correct, honest and rather prompt picture of what the status of the lease is .
. .." ROA 902-903.
20

CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, Sparks requests the following relief regarding issues raised
by Walker:
1.

Sparks requests that the Court of Appeals deny Walker's Rule 33 request.

2.

As to the district court's denial of attorneys' fees arising from Sparks' motion,

Sparks requests that the Court of Appeals affirm the district court's decision.
3.

As to the district court's denial of Walker's request for attorneys' fees associated

with its motion for summary judgment, Sparks requests that the Court of Appeals affirm the
district court's decision.
DATED this f2— day of August, 1994.

Stanford B. OAVen
John D>. Ray
FABIAN & CLENDENIN,
a Professional Corporation
Attorneys for Defendants/Appellants
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1

I

P R O C E E D I N G S

2
3

I

4

Down to Maaco Enterprises,

MR. POOLE:

Your Honor, Dennis Poole for

Emily Walker Trust.

5
6

the plaintiff.

7

MR. RAY:

g

Jack Ray for the defendants,

your Honor,

9
10

THE COURT:

MR. POOLE:

Your Honor, I think that there

I are three motions here, and I think that the motions of the

11

defendant probably should go first, that's with respect to

12

the assignment of the lease.

13

judgment and attorney's fees;

24

I

Our motions are for summary

THE COURT:

15

MR. RAY:

K5

Okay.

You may proceed.

Thank you.

In defendants' motion, they seek basically two

17

things.

18

judgment's operation over the next eight years, and the

19

second is a declaration regarding excess rents which are

20

going to be paid in later years under a lease with the

2i
22

One is a mechanism to increase the efficiency of the

I substitute tenants.
We are not seeking to reduce or delay our obliga-

23

tions under the lease.

We're not seeking to relitigate this

24

case or the issues that were raised at trial; all we're

25

attempting to do is improve the efficiency of the judgment's
2
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»

operation.
At present, the deficiency between the amount
I

3

which would have been owing under the Sparks lease, so-

4

called Sparks lease, and the amount under the substitute

5

lease, is only about 150 to $200 a month, but the total

6

exposure of the defendants over the next eight years i s —

7

exceeds $200,000.

g

significant to the defendants, and the whole purpose of

S o , i t ' s — t h e s e issues are rather

9

I this is to attempt to obtain a procedure which will protect

10
H

the defendants' rights and preserve the plaintiff's rights
and increase the efficiency of the judgment's operation.

12

And I have set forth a number of explanations in
my memoranda regarding how it would do that.

13
14

THE COURT:

15

MR. RAY:

Yeah.

I've seen them.

If vou'd like me to repeat

IQ

I those or explain them further, I can.

yi

J

2g

I I understand your position and I've looked at the chart

THE COURT:

Well, I think you need not.

19

t h a t — t h a t corporate counsel's prepared a n d — a n d understand

20

the position there.

21

MR. RAY: Okay.

I think, over the

22

course of the past couple of weeks, the defendants and the

23

plaintiff h a v e — h a v e been attempting to negotiate the

24

establishment of a mechanism which would laraely satisfy the

25

concerns, I believe, of both parties.
3
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And essentially, those

1
2
3
4
5

are to establish a mechanism whereby the defendants would
be able to know on a monthly basis whether the rent's being
paid and how much, so that they would be immediately aware
of any default, and exactly how much the monthly deficiency
which is owing is.

And in the event of a default, so that

they could be able to pursue any monetary default against
6
the substitute tenant.

That would relieve t h e — t h e plaintiff

7
of the burden of pursuing such an action for rent deficiency.
8
THE COURT:

9
10
11
12
13

L e t — l e t m e — I — I want to

get something straight in my mind, because I read through
this—
MR. RAY:

Okay.

THE COURT:

I read through all these

documents last evening and then when I got home, it dawned
14
on me that I had a question.
15
16

As I recall, the w a y — t h e posture in which this
case was last left when I applied my fine, Italian hand to

17
it, was that t h e — a l l right, now I'm mixed up on p a r t i e s —
18
yeah, that the plaintiff, in effect, had reclaimed the
19
shopping center, and i t was now in t h e — i t was in the
20
position, in order to meet its obligation under Utah law of
21
mitigating damages, of re-leasing the premises at the best
22
commercial rate available, applying that to the agreed
23
rental, and if there's any deficiency, then of course that
24
becomes a deficiency against your client; if there is none,
25
4
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then the surplusage after the payment of any judgments and

1
2

- s o o n would go back to your client-

is that not the status

I that we find ourselves in?
4

|

MR. RAY:

5

, your last phrase, I believe, is probably still at issue if I

6

I understand the position of the plaintiff, and that would be
as to what the—the disposition of the surplus rent would be,

7

It's our position that that should be paid back to

8

the defendants in this case as mitigation of the previous

9

damages which the plaintiffs have—have experienced,

10
u

12
13
14
15

I

THE COURT:
question.

18
19

Yeah.

That's the key

You've got the—you've got the point, you're

negative, you hit neutral, you start into a positive
position; does the future positive get applied to past
negative?
MR. RAY:

16
17

It is, except for that l a s t —

I believe—I believe there's

Utah—
THE COURT:

Right?

I don't know.

But

for the moment—we'll get to t h a t —

20

MR. RAY:

Okay.

21

THE COURT:

— b u t for the moment, as a

22

matter of legal vesting, if you want to use that terminology,

23

the landlord currently is Emily Walker Trust.

24

MR. RAY:

That's correct.

25

THE COURT:

And they are leasing that
5
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property that was formerly leased to Sparks under the terms

2

and conditions of the decree h e r e — I mean, t h e — t h e — t h e

3

J legal ramifications of t h e — o f the lease and the receipt of

4

income for that leasing, are governed by the terms of t h i s —

5

of this decree and the applicable law; that is, the appli-

6

cation against the amount due from your client, had they not

7

breached their lease.

Right?

8

MR. RAY:

9

J obligation to mitigate their damages by releasinq—

10

THE COURT:

11

MR. RAY:

12

Yes.

T h e y — y e a h , they have an

Right.
— t h e premises in a commercially

reasonable fashion.
"frHE COURT:

13

Okay.

Nov;, so your client

14

has no legal claim whatsoever to occupancy or possession of

15

the premises.

1G

MR. RAY:

Well, I believe that's really

17

an open question under the law where we've paid all of the

18

rent and we're still under the hook to pay the rent and

19

satisfy all of those monetary obligations,

20

rights are in relation to preserving the future occupancv and

21

payment of rent by substitute tenants under the premises.

22

THE COURT:

23

MR. RAY:

exactly what our

Okay,
So, I — I

don't know that

24

there's any Utah law directly on point on that issue; but

25

I think that's kind of what the gist of this motion is, is to
6
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try and preserve whatever rights the defendants have t o —
1
Yeah, well, that%s exactly

THE COURT:
2

what—that's what I'm trying to analyze here.

And it seems

3
to me that your position, and I'll just.say this to get
4
ideas—get a — a idea of the respective positions.

Your

5
position is that because your client is in effect obligated
6
to at least make up any deficiency between the rental
7
actually received and that which would have been received had
8
the lease continued, therefore, your client would like to
9
have, and you say, I think, has a right to have assigned to
10
it the lease or the lessor's interest in that lease and—
11
together with all the responsibilities thereunder.
12
MR. RAY:

Yeah.

That's an initial

13
position, your Honor.

We recognize that there may be an

14
alternate remedy which would satisfy our concerns without an
15
absolute assignment of all rights under the substitute
16
lease.
17
THE COURT:

And what would that be?

18
MR. RAY:

Well, the—the proposal which

19
has been discussed with—with Mr. Poole has been that the
20
landlord, the managing agent, would provide us with a
21
monthly affidavit within, you know, five days or a week
22
after the rental payment from the substitute tenant is due
23
indicating the rent paid, whether there's been a default,
24
and attaching a copy of the check.

That would provide us

25
7
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1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

first with an indication of whether there's a default and
what our obligation is.
Second, if there has been a default, the landlord
would be provided with a reasonable opportunity to get the
substitute tenant to cure the default.

In the event that it

is not cured and the default is monetary in nature, then we
would be assigned the right to pursue the substitute tenant
for the deficiency and evict him from the premises.
Now, that would relieve the landlord of the
obligation of doing that.

In the meantime, we would be

making all of the monthly payments directly to the landlord,
so there would be no gap in them receiving everything that
they're entitled to under the Sparks lease.
It would allow us to—not to have to quibble with
them over how they're pursuing the litigation against the
substitute tenant, whether their attorney's fees in that
litigation are reasonable because we would be fronting and
pursuing all of those burdens, ourselves.
Also, if the substitute tenant is evicted, then we
would retain a broker with—you know, who would be approved
by the landlord, and we would be consulting with that broker
for the establishment of a substitute tenant who they would,
you know, obviously within standards of commercial reasonableness, have the opportunity to approve, because it's their
shopping center.
8
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1

That w o u l d —

2

THE COURT:

I ~ t h e ~ t h e thing that's

3

driving this idea, I take it, is because that under the

4

arrangement with the Gasperinis, there will be a surplusage

5

over the amount your clients' obligated to pay as the term

6

of the lease runs.

7

MR. RAY:

That's—that's one issue, your

8

Honor, but that—that surplusage is only abour $7,500.

I

9

think the larger issue is knowing exactly how much rent is

10

being received from the substitute tenant, and being able to

11

pursue a deficiency and then hire a broker, so that we're

12

satisfied that somebody is getting in there as quickly as

13

possible, because our total exposure under this lease is far

14

greater than the surplusage is, even though that's—

15

THE COURT:

16

MR. RAY:

17

THE COURT:

18

MR. RAY:

Oh, yeah.

Certainlv.

— a n issue.
Certainly.
So, we want to—we want to do

19

that without having to come back into Court, you know,

20

wondering whether t h e — t h e broker has been retained in a

2i

timely fashion, whether he's been working hard.

22

would be our broker, we wouldn't be able to come back into

23

Court and claim that they haven't b e e n — b e e n seeking to

24

mitigate their damages or acting in a commercially reasonable

25

fashion.
9
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Since it

THE COURT:

1
2
3

So, you have two benefits.

One, you don't have to come back in and raise a claim
against the trust, that they failed to properly mitigate,
really.

4
MR. RAY: That's correct, your Honor.

5

THE COURT:

6
7
8
9

benefit of additional or higher rentals that could be
obtained, whether by reason that the Gasperinis stay in the
premises—I guess they're out, is that—
MR. RAY: There has been—I'm not exactly

10
11
12

clear what the current status of the property is, but I
think they're—
THE COURT:

13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23

And secondly, any—any

Well, whatever; but i f — i f —

if they or some other tenant paid more rental in the future
than your client would be obligated to do, then your client
would get the benefit of that.

I mean, that's the position

you—you want?
MR. RAY: That's our position, yes.
THE COURT:

Okay.

All right.

Do you have any—when I read your—I read your
briefs, I didn't get the impression that you had any Utah law
that said that under the well-established, and I think it's
almost universal, principle, that a landlord has a duty to
mitigate its damages.

That where a situation such as this,

24
a relatively long-term lease, is in effect, that the former
25
10
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tenant, now found to be a defaulting tenant, has a right to

2

an assignment of the landlord's leasing rights, in effect,

3

I think that's really what we're talking about, and a right

4
5

I to, in effect, control the property as a—as a tenant with
a subtenant.

6

MR. RAY: Yeah.

7

THE COURT:

g
9

I just don't—1 didn't see

J that you had any cases that I thought said that there's
clearly a right that the tenant has,
MR. PAY:

10

Yeah, I don't think the issue

11

has come before a Utah appellate court as to exactly what—

12

I mean, there's Reid vs. Mutual of Omaha, which establishes

13

sort of the broad features of how this procedure is to be

14

established; but I don't know that they ever directly address

15

exactly what the residual rights of a defaulting tenant are.
THE COURT: And I think that's exactly

16
17
18

the issue.
MR. RAY: And I think here, you know,

19

even if it weren't an absolute assignment, you know, there

20

is a mechanism which the Court does have equitable power

21

under, it's continuing jurisdiction or under Rule 60(b) to

22

establish, which would preserve all of the landlord's rights

23

and preserve the landlord's control of the property, really*

24
25

All we're talking about are the monetary obligations of the substitute tenant and pursuing a monetary
11
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default, and then having responsibility for paying a broker

2

who we would also have the right to consult as would the

3

landlord.

4

THE COURT:

Uh huh.

5

MR. RAY: And I think those, you know,

6

the ability of the Court to do that i s — i s established.

There

7

isn't a Utah case which expressly deals with the issue, but

8

I think the Court would have, at the very least, the equitable

9

I power to do that in order to preserve our interests and our

10

rights where we do have an obligation here potentially of

H

several hundred thousand dollars and concern over, you know,

12

how—how things are being negotiated with a substitute

13

tenant and who's out there and what's being paid and—and i t —

14

it seems like a more equitable remedy which would simplify

15

things, both for the landlord as well as preserving the

16

interests of the defendants.
THE COURT:

17
18

Well, I see your position.

I — I — y o u know, I clearly do.

19

MR. RAY: Thank you.

20

THE COURT:

21

MR. RAY: Just if I might touch on one or

22
23

Anything further?

two issues, I guess,
That is in terms of the excess rents, I believe

24

there is Utah law which establishes our right and we've

25

cited that case in our briefs, to receive that excess rent
12
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as a reduction of our damages, since essentially it results

2

from the landlord's efforts to mitigate.

3

The Emily Walker Trust at the trial, as your Honor

4

may recall, paid a substantial amount in brokerage fees for

5

placing that substitute tenant in the premises and subsequent

5

brokerage fees would also be paid for bv us and we believe

7

that's an additional—

8
9

THE COURT:
I

MR. RAY:

Oh.

Yeah, I saw that,

—reason for us to be able to

receive those excess rents.

10

Finally, if I might just address, and I suppose

11
12

this is a little out of turn, Mr. Poole's motion for summary

13

judgment regarding attorney's fees relating to this

14

I particular motion.

15

|

16

I 9et

THE COURT:
to

We'll

that problem, yeah.

17
18

Yeah, go ahead.

MR. RAY:

That might save—save things a

little bit.

19

I believe that under the terms of the lease which

20

is referenced in the judgment, that the attornev's fees for

2i

I this particular motion would not be recoverable, that the

22

attorney's fees clause in the lease concerns itself more

23

with the actual "breach by a tenant, the recovery of past due

24

rent and that kind of thing.

25

seeking here is something more in the nature of establishing

And I believe the remedy we're

13
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1
2
3

a mechanism for future obligations under the judgment and
doesn't fall strictly within the terms of that attorney's
fees provision.
THE COURT:

4

MR. RAY:

5

MR. POOLE:

8

13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

Thank you, your Honor.

Your Honor, I won't regurgitate the material in the

9

12

Thank you.

Mr. Poole?

7

11

Thank you.

THE COURT:

6

10

Okav.

memorandum, but I would like to stress a couple of points, if
I may.
I believe that the mechanism is already set forth
in the Reid case to deal with the issues which have been
raised by counsel.

In the event of future deficiencies, or

the breach of the existing subtenants, the landlord has a
continuing duty to mitigate, which is judged in a commercially
reasonable standard.
At that time, if in fact there is a deficiencv, we
would assert the claim against the defendants, Sparks and
Maaco, and we would have to establish commercially reasonable
standards and efforts to mitigate it.
The Reid case clearly says that we look at matters
occurring to that date.

We don't make any future—or give

any future credits for rents that might be paid.

The very

analysis and reasoning of the Reid case was, we don't
14
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2

speculate.

2

For that reason, we don't believe that this Court

3

should or can, for that matter, rule that future rents would

4

be subject to a credit or offset based upon what's been paid

5

to date.

6

There haven't been any excess rents paid.
Admittedly, under the terms of the Gasperini

7

lease commenced in, I think, in January of '94, there might

8

be, and it's only that, there might be excess rents;

9

unfortunately, the Gasperinis are in default, they are no

20

I longer in possession of the property, another lease has been

11

entered into, which I believe to be on substantially

12

identical financial terms.

23

I

With respect to the assignment issue or something

24

akin to an assignment of this sublease, the problem we see,

15

your Honor, is an issue of control.

16

r e l i e f s — o r claims or relief that we obtained from this Court

27

One of the requested

I was possession of the property, and with that possession,

18

goes the right to select tenants within the confines of the

29

law, being commercially reasonable, we have the right to

20

J

administer that lease, we have the right to, you know,

21

basically dictate the management of that property.

And by

22

virtue of trying to assign the benefits of the sublease to

23

I

Sparks and Maaco, I think we lose some of those particular

24

J

rights.

25

Sparks and Maaco, I believe, might be interested
15
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1

solely in the monetary aspects of this lease, or the p e r -

2

formance of the subtenant o r — y e t , our interests a r e , I

3

think ? much more extensive.

4

and u s e clauses and waste and things of that nature.

5

think if we make a partial assignment, we have some

5

confusion before the Court as to who's going to enforce

7

this; what if w e want to evict, they don't want to evict.

8

We're concerned about insurance
And I

It simply, I think, raises additional conflict

9

a n d — a n d problems for the Court, which we'll be back here

10

asking this Court to resolve.

H

the mechanism which the Supreme Court has given u s .

12

I think we should stay with

Your. Honor, in terms of the attorney's fees issue,

23

I believe that we are entitled to attorney's fees relative

24

to resisting this motion.

25

versy arises out of the breach of the lease agreement and

2G

trying to decide what the remedies and the obligations of

27

the parties are, and we're trying to d o that, again, by

28

virtue of that breach.

29

entitled to fees.

20

This motion, this entire contro-

For that reason, I think we're

Your Honor, I will briefly^speak to the other

22

motion.

22

respect to deficiency of $921.70.

23

fees relative to that of $300, if I didn't have to attend

24

We filed a motion for a summary judgment with

I the hearing on this matter.

25

I asked for attorney's

I w a s handed at the commencement

of this hearing, a check for $921.70, which is the principal

I

16
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1

obligation owing, it does not include interest, it does not

2

include any attorney's fees.

3

least a nominal amount of attorney's fees on t h a t — t h a t

4

issue.

5

I think w e 1 r e entitled to at

W e have not ever received a voluntary payment from

6

the defendants.

7

judgment every time we have requested a deficiency.

8

Thank you.

9

THE COURT:

10

MR. RAY:

U

Any response?
If I might, your Honor, and

I'll try and be brief.

12
23

We've had to file motions for summary

THE COURT:

Let m e — l e t me ask you, the

J last question, Counsel, o r — o r question that came up in

24

response to the last statement.

25

I s — a n d I'm not impugning Mr. Poole's truthfulness;

26

but do you agree that your client has never made a voluntary

17

payment under this judgment t o — t o the trust?

28

I

29

j history o f — o f what's happened and t h a t ' s — t h a t is partly

20

J the reason for this motion, your Honor.

2i

I

22

I statements from the property manager and in response, sent

23

I letters to the property manager requesting additional

24

| documentation.

25

it requested.

I

M R . RAY:

I think if I could explain the

Earlier this year, our client received a couple of

Our client didn't receive the documentation
Ultimately, there w a s correspondence and I

17
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believe one conversation between my client and M r . Poole
1
directly, and my client felt that it was simply an accounting
2
matter, and that he could address it directly with Emily
3
Walker Trust.

Emily Walker Trust wanted all communications

4
to go through M r . Poole.
5
My client requested, I believe, an affidavit from
6
the property manager on the payment of rent and some
7
additional documentation and wanted to basically set up a
8
procedure so that there wouldn't be controversies.

All of

9
this took several months and resulted, finally, in the
10
initial motion for summary judgment that was filed by
11
Mr. Poole, I believe about four months ago.
12
When that motion was filed, then it was resolved
13
by the payment of a check.

I don't believe it w a s — w e ever

14
even needed to file a responsive memorandum on that, but it
15
arose out of what our client felt was not receiving the
16
documentation it needed to assure itself as to exactly
17
what was being paid and received under the lease, so that
18
they could determine their obligation.
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

This latest motion, again, my client just tells me
that he hadn'tj received any statements from the property
manager as to these amounts of past due rent.

For the last

couple of weeks, there i s — S p a r k s , if I'm correct, is in the
process of liquidation and has to get checks from a n o t h e r —
from the parent corporation.

And there was some confusion
18
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as to when that check was sent and ultimately, we just cut
1
2
3
4
5

it directly from my law firm to Mr. Poole; but we would have
paid those amounts if we felt that we had received the
documentation that would have indicated to us exactly what
had been paid.

And I believe my client has indicated that

he did not receive that documentation.
6
Again, the payments of those amounts i s — i s — a t

7
8
9
10
11
12
13

this point, the difference is really rather minor, and it's
not that Sparks thinks because it's minor it's not goincr to
do it, but rather, because it's minor, they wouldn't have
any incentive not to be doing it, and to be getting themselves in trouble with the Court by thumbing their nose at
the judgment.

And that certainly hasn't been their intent

i n — i n what they've been doing.
14
Some of the things that Mr. Poole stated, I

15
16
17
18

believe point up the—the fact that the remedy which the
defendants are suggesting would be more efficient and would
be fairer to the parties and preserve both parties'
interest.

19
20

If we're continually coming back in here every
six months contesting commercial reasonableness, I believe

21
it's inefficient.

The procedure which we have established

22
would put the burdens on us, while still preserving the
23
landlord's right to control the use of the property, to
24
control the tenant's conduct out of the premises.
25
19
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All—all

we're really concerned with is that the tenant is out there
1
2

paying his full rent and paying his CAM charges and if they
want to evict the tenant because he's all of a sudden

3
changed his business o r , you know, i s — i s trashing the place,
4
t h a t ' s — t h a t would be a right that would be retained by the
5
landlord.
6
7
8
9

O u r — w h a t we're interested in is a monetary
default in pursuing the tenant in the event of a monetary
default or in the event of an eviction, being able to work
with the landlord and directly with the joint broker in

10
terms of putting somebody back in there and paying t h e — t h e
11
brokerage fee directly.
12
I believe also some of the concerns we have arise
13
from the fact t h a t — t h a t for instance, there is a new
14
substitute tenant out there, and we haven't seen the new
15
lease with the substitute tenant and I'm not sure if we really
1G
even know who all of the current occupants of those
17
premises are, and so it's those kinds of things t h a t — t h a t
18
have registered or created the concerns in the defendants'
19
mind and their interest in preserving the residual rights
20
they have and in establishina a more efficiency mechanism.
21
Thank you.
22
THE COURT:

Thank you.

MR. POOLE:

Your Honor, may I make one

23
24
25

brief statement?
20
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1

THE COURT:

You may.

2

MR. POOLE:

With respect to the calcula-

3

tion of this rental deficiency, Mr. Wanca has the same

4

documents I have.

5

Sparks Maaco lease, it's a simple computation.

6

for, at least the trial, what the amount of the deficiency

7

would be on a monthly basis.

8

I can.

9

I

MR. R A Y :
I

He's known

He can compute it as easily as

Thank you.

10
11

He has the Gasperini lease f he has the

May I speak to that?

We do know what the monthly deficiency is, but we

12

don't know what's actually being paid, your Honor.

13

THE COURT:

14

comments here.

15
16

Well, let me make some

I—I

can see the appeal, particularly from the

I defendants' point of view, of the proposed arrangement,

17

whether it's an assignment or some type of greater ability

18

to control and be sure that the income is being received from

19

the premises.

20

|

21

J owner, the plaintiff in this case, based on they have no

22

I further responsibility to pay for the brokeracre fees for a

23

And I can even see some benefits to t h e — t o the

lease b e i n g — i f they have to procure a new tenant, and some

24

I of the other problems.

25

J

on the other hand, it seems to me that the general
21
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2
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principle of landlord and tenant law that we're dealing with
here says that when the tenant's been—when a tenancy's been
terminated, the landlord gets his premises back and the

3
landlord then has the duty to mitigate; but you've got to
4
keep in mind that in a rather bitterly contested lawsuit
5
here, the side that prevailed was the tenant—or was the
6
landlord.
7
There obviously are not and will not be good
8
feelings between these parties, and it seems to me that the
9
duty to mitigate excludes just—just by the way that it's
10
defined as operating in landlord and tenant cases, excludes
11
the land—the tenant having anything other than a right to
12
determine that the property's been leased in a commercially
13
reasonable fashion and that the landlord is pursuing all of
14
the things that a landlord has to pursue in order to reason15
ably mitigate its damages.

That's the landlord's obligation

16
and the expectation and right of the defaulting tenant.
17
But it seems to me that that is a far cry from
18
placing upon the landlord the duty of entering back into an
19
arrangement whereby a tenant that is in default and has been
20
so held to be and has been removed from the premises is back
21
in effect, in control of the premises and dealing directly
22
with the person that that tenant puts in possession and
23
making determinations as to, particularly in a — i n a mall
24
or a strip mall-type operation, the—the very questions that
25
22
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are—that are vital to the owner; that is as some of those
that Mr. Poole mentioned, the disposition of waste or waste
upon the premises in a legal sense, the type of operation
being carried on in that premises, the quality of the tenant
in all of the—in all of the applications of that term,
"quality", cleanliness, people that don't disrupt the operation of the rest of the—of the shopping center, not only bv
reason of their business, but by the way they carry it on;
all kinds of things, reliability, do they lock the place up
at night, do they work at—after hours, do they have a
tendency to cheat and fudge on rules and regulations or do
they simply ignore them and are constantly a source of
problem.
It seems to me that you build right back into the
relationship between the parties some of the exact problems
that they had before, and I don't think that the concept of
the landlord-tenant relationship, after a tenant has found—
been found to be in default and is removed from the premises
and the duty of the landlord to mitigate includes the tenant
having the kinds of rights that are urged here.
Secondly, even if it did, I think the question
about the financial part of this is premature. The landlord
clearly has a duty to mitigate, and the landlord clearly
has a duty to provide to the defaulting tenant information
which will give that information—or give that tenant a
23
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correct, honest and rather prompt picture of what the status

2

of that lease is and that if the tenant then has concerns

3

that can be articulated and are legally enforceable about

4

the fact the t e n a n t — t h e landlord isn't meeting his or her

5

obligation, or its obligation, to mitigate, that those

6

issues can thus be raised.

7

Now, I recognize that that is not as convenient

8

or as easy as the proposal that 1 s — t h a t 1 s — t h a t - s mentioned,

9

and I'm not saying that the proposal as mentioned is not a

10
n

12

wa

Y

to

9° u n d e r certain circumstances; but I am saying that

I don't think that the landlord in this case is legally
I obligated to enter into that kind of arrangement and that's

13

in effect what is being asked here of the Court, is to

14

require the landlord to do so.

25

I think in effect that that question is simply

16

premature at this point.

!7

for instance, or any other tenant fell apart for no reason

18

of the landlord's and our economic situation in this

29

community went to pot like it did for the last 15 years

20

until all of a sudden we had this wonderful economic boom,

21

it could be that for the rest of the term of this lease,

22

t h a t — t h a t there would be a — a

23

from no fault of t h e — o f the landlord's.

24
25

If the situation with the Gasperinis

flat negative flow in there

On the other hand, if the landlord, through its
own fault, negligent or otherwise, failed to keep a tenant
24
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that could and would and should pay increases, then in that
!
3

event, I think the tenant would have the right to enforce
that mitigation question.
Now, I'm not making a ruling at this moment

4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12

because, again, I think it's premature as to whether any
future excesses or surplusages in those rental payments
should b e — b e credited against past deficiencies.
should a n d — a n d

If they

I ' m — a n d I'm not sure that they shouldn't,

I'm just ruling on that issue; but assuming they should,
what the tenant would have us do now is hold those in
arrearage in anticipation of the upcoming surplusage and then
apply it back.

The same effect i s — t h e same result is

affected except that the landlord at this point is entitled
13
to their rental now, as if the tenant were in place

and—

14
and not obligated to h a v e — t o wait and you say, no Counsel,
15
they're not obligated to wait?
16
MR. POOLE:

17

MR. RAY:

18

21
22
23
24
25

It's—

No, we're n o t —

THE COURTi

19
20

No.

Oh, all right.

All right.

Okay.
MR. RAY:

We're not seeking excesses

right now, only w h e n — w h e n and as they're paid.
THE COURT:

Yeah.

Well, when and as

they're paid, this is not a ruling, it's not even an
advisory ruling, maybe I shouldn't even say it, but it's,
25
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1

at this point, is my general understanding, that they

2

probably are e n t i t l e d — t h e tenant f s probably entitled to

3

those.

4

s u r p l u s — o r any d e f e c t s — a n y — a n y shortage that's up right

5

now, but I'm not going to rule on that issue.

6

issue has to be brought before the Court when and if that

7

in fact becomes a justiciable issue.

8

then of course, we'll have it briefed to the Court, then

9

we'll have a look at it at that time.

10

And in effect, that becomes a reimbursement for any

I think that

And in that event,

S o , I'm going to deny t h e — t h e motion for the

U

J assignment.

22

I tion, and I don't encourage that, and I know that that's

23

I more cumbersome than the procedure that has been p e r — b e e n

I recognize that it may lead to future litiga-

14
15

requested, but I don't think it trods upon the landlord's

16

think I can do that.

17

legal rights as the requested assignment would, and I don't

As far as the attorney's fees for this is concerned,

18

for this motion, I'm going to deny them at this time,

19

Mr. Poole.

20

the lease, but I think that the lease, in effect, was

21

terminated and over as of the time that the Court rendered

22

its judgment in this case and the time for appeal ran.

23

Therefore, at this point, I think we're working on post-

24

remedy-—or post-judgment remedies which are not affected by

25

the terras of t h e — o f the lease, but are affected by the

I think that we can say i t — i t rises out of

26
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1

general law.

2

Now, as to your motion for summary judgment, that

3

related to the arrearage.

4

point, that's moot.

5
6

Well, you don't need that at this

I'm going t o —
MR* POOLE:

Assuming the check clears,

I have no reason to believe it wouldn't.

7

THE COURT:

No. You have no reason to

9

MR. POOLE:

That it would not.

10

THE COURT:

— w o u l d not, veah.

8

believe i t —

At this

H

point, I'm not going to award attorney's fees on that one,

22

either; but I am going to say this to the landlord—or to the

13

tenant:

14

t h e — t h e landlord will provide adequate information to

15

determine a question of arrearage and occupancy and the

IQ

I things that you have a right to know, or your client has a

With the history that we've had here, assuming that

yi

right to know, under i t s — u n d e r the landlord's duty to

18

mitigate and under your client's duty to pay anything that

19

can't be mitigated, assuming you get that information

20

adequately and promptly, if we have back before us again

2i

another question of collection of those amounts based upon

22

they just aren't paid when due, the Court's going to have a

23

good, hard look at attorney's fees.

24
25

MR. WANCA:

I understand that, your Honor.

If I could address the Court very briefly on that issue.
27
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1

THE COURT:

2

MR. WANCA:
THE

3
4

COURT:

Well, I —
I—1~
I'm not granting them at

this point•
MR

5

* WANCA:

N o . I just want the Court

6

to know I don't know t h i n k — w e — w e put on evidence to that

7

effect, but I wrote the managing agent in January of this

8

year requesting that information; I didn't get it. Six

9

weeks later, I got a letter from Mr. Poole, which I asked

10

him for that information once again and rather than aive it

H

to m e , he provided it as f o r — a s part of his motion for

12

summary judgment.

13

if we got that information.

We c o u l d — w e — w e didn't need to be here

14

THE COURT:

Well, that's--

25

MR. WANCA:

That's our position.

16

THE COURT:

That's one of the reasons

yi

is at this point I understand there's some dispute about

!8

that, and that's why I'm not going to award any attorney's

19

I fees and costs at this time.

But I am saying that if we

20

have this kind of a dispute in the future, the Court's going

2i

to award fees and costs on such side as it finds to be, in

22

effect, dilatory in this matter, because that tends to

23

reduce litigation, and that's what we want to do.

24

MR. WANCA:

I don't want to be back here,

25

THE COURT:

All right.

;

I would suggest

28
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1

1

that if the—if the landlord
•TnTmTTT"""!"
I
r a ln
sists that you deal through
Mr. Poole, that you deal with Mr. Poole and save the time of

3

I running through the managing-the property manager, if
(

5
6
7

8
9
10
11

fact that's what they want to do,
MR

|

THE

|

If that's what they want,

C0UR

T:

Yeah.

if thev don't, then

Court has made this ruling that the information be supplied—
excuse me—promptly, if your client wants prompt payment.
MR. POOLE:

We have no objection to

providing that information.
THE COURT:

All right.

Mr. Poole, will

you prepare an appropriate order?

17
18
19

21

-

I would think you ought to advise your client that the

16

20

WANCA

that's fine, too. But either way, Mr. Poole, I would r e —

14
15

-

, then, they can.pay his fees.

12
13

m

MR. POOLE:

I will.

THE COURT:

Thank you.

MR. POOLE:

Thank you, your Honor.

THE COURT:

We'll be in recess until

the 10:30 calendar.
(Whereupon, this hearing was concluded.)

22
*

*

*

23
24
25
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I do further certify that I am not counsel, attorney

15

or relative of either party, or clerk or stenographer of

1G

either party or of the attorney of either party, or otherwise

17

interested in the event of this suit.

18
19

Dated at Salt Lake City, Utah, this 22nd day of
November, 1993.

20
21
22
23

(SEAL)

24
25

31
ALAN P. SMITH. CSR
» BRAHMA DRIVE (801)2664320
SALT LAKE CITY. UTAH 64107

